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Abstract We propose an efficient framework for en-
abling secure multi-party numerical computations in a
Peer-to-Peer network. This problem arises in a range of
applications such as collaborative filtering, distributed
computation of trust and reputation, monitoring and
other tasks, where the computing nodes is expected to
preserve the privacy of their inputs while performing a
joint computation of a certain function.
Although there is a rich literature in the field of
distributed systems security concerning secure multi-
party computation, in practice it is hard to deploy those
methods in very large scale Peer-to-Peer networks. In
this work, we try to bridge the gap between theoretical
algorithms in the security domain, and a practical Peer-
to-Peer deployment.
We consider two security models. The first is the
semi-honest model where peers correctly follow the
protocol, but try to reveal private information. We pro-
vide three possible schemes for secure multi-party nu-
merical computation for this model and identify a sin-
gle light-weight scheme which outperforms the others.
Using extensive simulation results over real Internet
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topologies, we demonstrate that our scheme is scalable
to very large networks, with up to millions of nodes.
The second model we consider is the malicious
peers model, where peers can behave arbitrarily, delib-
erately trying to affect the results of the computation
as well as compromising the privacy of other peers.
For this model we provide a fourth scheme to defend
the execution of the computation against the malicious
peers. The proposed scheme has a higher complex-
ity relative to the semi-honest model. Overall, we pro-
vide the Peer-to-Peer network designer a set of tools to
choose from, based on the desired level of security.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of performing a joint numer-
ical computation of some function over a Peer-to-Peer
network. Such problems arise in many applications,
for example, when computing distributively trust [22],
ranking of nodes and data items [12], clustering [5],
collaborative filtering [6,35], factor analysis [14] etc.
The aim of secure multi-party computation is to enable
parties to carry out such distributed computing tasks in
a secure manner. Whereas distributed computing clas-
sically deals with questions of computing under the
threat of machine crashes and other inadvertent faults,
secure multi-party computation is concerned with the
possibility of deliberate malicious behavior by some
adversarial entity. That is, it is assumed that a proto-
col execution may come under attack by an external
entity, or even by a subset of the participating parties.
The aim of this attack may be to learn private infor-
mation or cause the result of the computation to be
incorrect. Thus, two central requirements on any se-
cure computation protocol are privacy and correctness.
The privacy requirement states that nothing should be
learned beyond what is absolutely necessary; more ex-
actly, parties should learn their designated output and
nothing else. The correctness requirement states that
each party should receive its correct output. Therefore,
the adversary must not be able to cause the result of
the computation to deviate from the function that the
parties had set out to compute.
In this paper, we consider only functions which are
built using the algebraic primitives of addition, sub-
straction and multiplication. In particular, we focus on
numerical methods which are computed distributively
in a Peer-to-Peer network, where in each iteration, ev-
ery node interacts with a subset of its neighbors by
sending scalar messages, and computing a weighted
sum of the messages that it receives. Examples of such
functions are belief propagation [28], EM (expecta-
tion maximization) [14], Power method [22], separa-
ble functions [26], gradient descent methods [33] and
linear iterative algorithms for solving systems of lin-
ear equations [10]. As a specific example, we describe
the Jacobi algorithm for computing such functions in
detail in Section 7.
There is a rich body of research on secure com-
putation, starting with the seminal work of Yao [34].
Part of this research is concerned with the design of
generic secure protocols that can be used for comput-
ing any function (for example, Yao’s work [34] for the
case of two participants, and e.g. [9,21] for solutions
for the case of multiple participants). There are sev-
eral works concerning the implementation of generic
protocols for secure computation. For example, Fair-
Play [25] is a system for secure two-party computa-
tion, and FairPlayMP [7] is a different system for se-
cure computation by more than two parties. These two
systems are based (like Yao’s protocol) on reducing
any function to a representation as a Boolean circuit
and computing the resulting Boolean circuit securely.
Our approach is much more efficient, at the cost of sup-
porting only a subset of the functions the FairPlay sys-
tem can compute.
A different line of work studies secure protocols
for computing specific functions (rather than generic
protocols for computing any function). Of particular
interest for us are works that add a privacy preserving
layer to the computation of functions such as the fac-
tor analysis learning problem (for which [14] describes
a secure multi-party protocol using homomorphic en-
cryption), computing trust in a Peer-to-Peer network
(for which [22] suggests a solution using a trusted third
party), or the work of [33], which is closely related to
our work, but is limited to two parties.
Most previous solutions for secure multi-party com-
putation suffer from one of the following drawbacks:
(1) they provide a centralized solution where all infor-
mation is shipped to a single computing node, and/or
(2) require communication between all participants in
the protocol, and/or (3) require the use of asymmet-
ric encryption, which is costly. In this work, we in-
vestigate secure computation in a Peer-to-Peer setting,
where each node is only connected to some of the other
nodes (its neighbors). We examine different possible
distributed approaches, and out of the them we identify
a single approach, which is theoretically secure and at
the same time efficient and scalable.
Security is often based on the assumption that there
is an upper bound on the global number of malicious
participants. In our setting, we consider the number of
malicious nodes in each local vicinity. Furthermore,
most of the existing algorithms scale to tens or hun-
dreds of nodes, at the most. In this work, we address
the problem in a setting of a large Peer-to-Peer net-
work, with millions of nodes and hundreds of millions
of communication links. Unlike most of the previous
work, we have performed a very large scale simula-
tion, using real Internet topologies, demonstrating that
our approach is applicable to real network settings.
As an example for applications of our framework,
we take the neighborhood based collaborative filter-
ing [6]. This algorithm is a recent state-of-the-art al-
gorithm. There are two challenges in adapting this al-
gorithm to a Peer-to-Peer network. First, the algorithm
is centralized and we propose a method to distribute
it. Second, we add a privacy preserving layer, so no
information about personal ranking is revealed during
the process of computation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
formulate our problem model. In Section 3 we give a
brief background of cryptographic primitives that are
used in our schemes. Section 4 outlines our novel con-
struction for the semi-honest model. In Section 5 we
review cryptographic primitives needed for extending
our construction to support the malicious adversary model.
Section 6 presents our extended construction for the
malicious adversary model. Example collaborative fil-
tering application is given in Section 7. Large scale
simulations are presented in Section 8. We conclude
in Section 9.
We use the following notations: T stands for a vec-
tor or matrix transpose, the symbols {·}i and {·}ij de-
note entries of a vector and matrix, respectively. Ni is
the set of neighboring nodes to node i. The spectral
radius ρ(B) , max1≤i≤s(|λi|), where λ1, . . . , λs are
the eigenvalues of a matrix B.
2 Our Model
Given a Peer-to-Peer network graph G = (V,E) with
|V | = n nodes and |E| = e edges, we would like
to perform a joint iterative computation. Each node i
2
starts with a scalar1 state x0i ∈ R, and on each round
sends messages to a subset of its neighbors. We denote
a message sent from node i to node j at round r asmrij .
Let Ni denote the set of neighboring nodes of i.
Denote the neighbors of node i as ni1 , ni2 , . . . , nik ,
where k = |Ni|. We assume, wlog, that each node
sends a message to a subset of its neighbors (possibly
including itself.) On each round r = 1, 2, · · · , node i
computes, based on the messages it received, a func-
tion f : Rk+1 → Rk+1,
〈mri i,m
r
i ni1
, · · · ,mri nik
〉 = f(mr−1i i , m
r−1
ni1
i, · · · ,m
r−1
nik
i) .
Namely, the function gets as input the initial state
(which is denoted as a self message mi i) and all the
received neighbor messages of this round, and outputs
a new state and messages to be sent to a subset of the
neighbors at the next round. The iterative algorithms
run either a predetermined number of rounds, or until
convergence is detected locally. Whenever the refer-
ence to the round number is clear from the text, the
round numbers are omitted to simplify our notations.
In this paper, we are only interested in functions
f that compute weighted sums on each iteration. Next
we show that there is a variety of such numerical meth-
ods. Our goal is to add a privacy preserving layer to
the distributed computation, such that the only infor-
mation learned by a node is its share of the output.
In Section 4 we use the semi-honest adversaries
model: in this model (common in cryptographic re-
search of secure computation) even corrupted parties
are assumed to correctly follow the protocol specifica-
tion. However, the adversary obtains the internal states
of all the corrupted parties (including the transcript of
all the messages received), and attempts to use this in-
formation to learn information that should remain pri-
vate.
Security against semi-honest adversaries might be
justified if the parties participating in the protocol are
somewhat trusted, or if we trust the participating par-
ties at the time they execute the protocol, but suspect
that at a later time an adversary might corrupt them and
get hold of the transcript of the information received in
the protocol.
Section 6 extends our construction to the “mali-
cious adversary”, which can behave arbitrarily. We note
that protocols secure against malicious adversaries are
considerably more costly than their semi-honest coun-
terparts. For example, the generic method of obtain-
ing security against malicious adversaries is through
the GMW compiler [21] which adds a zero-knowledge
proof for every step of the protocol.
1 An extension to the vector case is immediate, we omit it for
the clarify of description.
We define a configurable local system parameter
di, where di − 1 is the maximum number of nodes in
the local vicinity of node i (direct neighbors of node i)
that might be corrupted. Whenever this assertion is vi-
olated, the security of our proposed scheme is affected.
This is a stronger requirement from our system, rela-
tive to the traditional global bound on the number of
adversarial nodes.
3 Cryptographic primitives for the semi-host
model
We compare several existing approaches from the lit-
erature of secure multi-party computation and discuss
their relevance to Peer-to-Peer networks.
3.1 Random perturbations
The random additive perturbation method attempts to
preserve the privacy of the data by modifying values
of the sensitive attributes using a randomized process
(see [4,15,18]). In this approach, the node sends a value
ui + v, where ui is the original scalar message, and v
is a random value drawn from a certain distribution
V . In order to perturb the data, n independent sam-
ples v1, v2, · · · , vn, are drawn from a distribution V .
The owners of the data provide the perturbed values
u1+ v1, u2+ v2, · · · , un+ vn and the cumulative dis-
tribution functionFV (r) of V . The goal is to use these
values, instead of the original ones, in the computation.
(It is easy to see, for example, that if the expected value
of V is 0, then the expectation of the sum of the ui+vi
values is equal to the expectation of the ui values.) The
hope is that by adding random noise to the individual
data points it is possible to hide the individual values.
The random perturbation model is limited. It sup-
ports only addition operations, and it was shown in [15]
that this approach can ensure very limited privacy guar-
antees. We only present this method for comparing its
running time with the other protocols.
3.2 Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS)
Secret sharing is a fundamental primitive of crypto-
graphic protocols. We will describe the secret sharing
scheme of Shamir [30]. The scheme works over a field
F , and it is assumed that the secret s is an element in
that field. In a k-out-of-n secret sharing the owner of a
secret wishes to distribute it among n players such that
any subset of at least k of them is able to recover the
secret, while no subset of up to k− 1 players is able to
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learn any information about the secret. (In the applica-
tion described in this paper each player will be a node
in the network.)
In order to distribute the secret, its owner chooses a
random polynomialP () of degree k− 1, subject to the
constraint thatP (0) = s. This is done by choosing ran-
dom coefficients a1, . . . , ak−1 and defining the poly-
nomial as P (x) = s+
∑k−1
i=1 aix
i
. Each player is asso-
ciated with an identity in the field (denoted x1, . . . , xn
for players 1, . . . , n, respectively). The share that player
i receives is the value P (xi), namely the value of the
polynomial evaluated at the point xi. It is easy to see
that any k players can recover the secret, since they
have k values of the polynomial and can therefore in-
terpolate it and compute its free coefficient s. It is also
not hard to see that any set of up to k − 1 players does
not learn any information about s, since any value of s
has a probability of 1/|F | of resulting in a polynomial
which agrees with the values that the players have.
3.3 Homomorphic encryption
A homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption
scheme that allows certain algebraic operations to be
carried out on the encrypted plaintext, by applying an
efficient operation to the corresponding ciphertext (with-
out knowing the decryption key!). In particular, we
will be interested in additively homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes: Here, the message space is a ring (or a
field). There exists an efficient algorithm +pk whose
input is the public key of the encryption scheme and
two ciphertexts, and whose output is Epk(m1) +pk
Epk(m2) = Epk(m1 +m2). (Namely, this algorithm
computes, given the public key and two ciphertexts,
the encryption of the sum of the plaintexts of two ci-
phertexts.) There is also an efficient algorithm ·pk, whose
input consists of the public key of the encryption scheme,
a ciphertext, and a constant c in the ring, and whose
output is c ·pk Epk(m) = Epk(c ·m).
We will also require that the encryption scheme
has semantic security. An efficient implementation of
an additive homomorphic encryption scheme with se-
mantic security was given by Paillier [27]. In this cryp-
tosystem the encryption of a plaintext from [1;N ], where
N is a RSA modulus, requires two exponentiations mod-
ulo N2. Decryption requires a single exponentiation.
We will use this encryption scheme in our work.
3.3.1 Paillier encryption
We describe in a nutshell the Paillier cryptosystem.
Fuller details are found on [27].
– Key generation Generate two large primes p and
q. The secret key sk is λ = lcm(p− 1, q− 1). The
public key pk includes N = pq and g ∈ ZN2 such
that g ≡ 1 mod N .
– Encryption Encrypt a message m ∈ ZN with ran-
domness r ∈ Z∗N2 and public key pk as c = gmrN
mod N2.
– Decryption Decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗
N2
. De-
cryption is done using: L(c
λ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N where
L(x) = (x− 1)/N .
4 Our construction
The main observation we make is that numerous dis-
tributed numerical methods compute in each node a
weighted sum of scalars mji, received from neighbor-
ing nodes, namely
∑
j∈Ni
ajimji , (1)
where the weight coefficients aji are known constants.
This simple building block captures the behavior of
multiple numerical methods. By showing ways to com-
pute this weighted sum securely, our framework can
support many of those numerical methods. In this sec-
tion we introduce three possible approaches for per-
forming the weighted sum computation.
In Section 7.1 we give an example of the Jacobi al-
gorithm which computes such a weighted sum on each
iteration.
4.1 A Construction Based on Random Perturbations
In each iteration of the algorithm, whenever a node j
needs to send a value mji to a neighboring node i, the
node j generates a random number rji using the GMP
library [1], from a probability distribution with zero
mean. It then sends the value mji + rji to the other
node i. As the number of neighbors increases, the com-
puted noisy sum
∑
j∈Ni
(mji + rji) converges to the
actual sum
∑
j∈Ni
mji.
When the node i computes a weighted sum of the
messages it received as in equation 1, it multiplies each
incoming message by the corresponding weight. The
computed noisy sum
∑
j∈Ni
aji(mji+ rji) converges
to the actual sum
∑
j∈Ni
ajimji.
We note again that this method is considered mainly
for a comparison of its running time with those of the
other methods.
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4.2 A Construction Based on Homomorphic
Encryption
We chose to utilize the Paillier encryption scheme, which
is an efficient realization of an additive homomorphic
encryption scheme with semantic security.
Key generation: We use the threshold version of the
Paillier encryption scheme described in [20]. In this
scheme, a trusted third party generates for each node
i private and public key pairs.2 The public key is dis-
seminated to all of node i neighbors. The private key
λi = prvk(i) is kept secret from all nodes (including
node i). Instead, it is split, using secret sharing, to the
neighbors of node i. There is a threshold di, which is at
most equal to |Ni|, the number of neighbors of node i.
The scheme ensures that any subset of di of the neigh-
bors of node i can help it decrypt messages (without
the neighbors learning the decrypted message, or node
i learning the private key). If di = |Ni| then the pri-
vate key is shared by giving each neighbor j a random
value sji subject to the constraint
∑
j∈Ni
sji = λi =
prvk(i). Otherwise, if di < |Ni| the values sji are
shares of a Shamir secret sharing of λi. Note that fewer
than di neighbors cannot recover the key.
Using this method, all neighboring nodes of node
i can send encrypted messages using pubk(i) to node
i, while node i cannot decrypt any of these messages.
It can, however, aggregate the messages using the ho-
momorphic property and ask a coalition of di or more
neighbors to help it in decrypting the sum.
The initialization step of this protocol is as follows:
[H0] The third party creates for node i a public and pri-
vate key pair, [pubk(i), prvk(i)]. It sends the pub-
lic key pubk(i) to all of node i’s neighbors, and
splits the private key into shares, such that each
node i neighbors gets a share sji. If di = |Ni|
then prvk(i) = λi =
∑
j∈Ni
sji. Otherwise the
sji values are Shamir shares of the private key.
One round of computation: In each round of the al-
gorithm, when a node j would like to send a scalar
value mji to node i it does the following:
[H1] Encrypt the message mji, using node i public key
to get Cji = Epubk(i)(mji).
[H2] Send the result Cji to node i.
2 It is also possible to generate the key in a distributed way,
without using any trusted party. This option is less efficient. We
show that eventhough the usage of a centralized key generation
process is not efficient enough, and therefore we have not imple-
mented the distributed version of this protocol.
[H3] Node i aggregates all the incoming message Cji,
using the homomorphic property to get
Epubk(i)(
∑
ajimji).
After receiving all messages: Node i’s neighbors as-
sist it in decrypting the result xi, without revealing the
private key prvk(i). This is done as follows (for the
case di = |Ni|): Recall that in a Paillier decryption
node i needs to raise the result computed in [H3] to
the power of its private key λi.
[H4] Node i sends all its neighbors the result computed
in [H3]: Ci = Epubk(i)(
∑
ajimji).
[H5] Each neighbor, computes a part of the decryption
wji = C
sji
i where sji are node i private key shares
computed in step [H0], and sends the result wji to
node i.
[H6] Node i multiplies all the received values to get:
Πj∈Niwji = C
P
j∈Ni
sji
i = C
λi
i =
=
∑
ajimji mod N.
If di < |Ni| then the reconstruction is done using
Lagrange interpolation in the exponent, where node i
needs to raise each wji value by the corresponding La-
grange coefficient, and then multiply the results.
Regarding message overhead, first we need to gen-
erate and disseminate public and private keys. This op-
eration requires 2e messages, where e = |E| is the
number of graph edges. In each iteration we send the
same number of messages as in the original numerical
algorithm. However, assuming a security of ℓ bits, and
a working precision of d bits, we increase the size of
the message by a factor of ℓ
d
. Finally, we add e mes-
sages for obtaining the private keys parts in step [H4].
Regarding computation overhead, for each message
sent, we need to perform one Paillier encryption in step
[H1]. In step [H3] the destination node performs addi-
tional k−1 multiplications, and one decryption in step
[H4]. At the key generation phase, we add generation
of n random polynomial and their evaluation. In step
[H4] we compute an extrapolation of those n polyno-
mials. The security of the Paillier encryption is inves-
tigated in [27,20], where it was shown that the system
provides semantic security.
4.3 A Construction Based on Shamir Secret Sharing
We propose a construction based on Shamir’s secret
sharing, which avoids the computation cost of asym-
metric encryption. In a nutshell, we use the neighbor-
hood of a node for adding a privacy preserving mech-
anism, where only a coalition of di or more nodes can
reveal the content of messages sent to that node.
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In each round of the algorithm, when a node j would
like to send a scalar value mji to node i it does the fol-
lowing:
[S1] Generate a random polynomial Pji of degree di−
1, of the type Pji(x) = mji +
∑di−1
l=1 alx
l
.
[S2] For each neighbor l of node i, create a share Cjil of
the polynomial Pji(x) by evaluating it on a single
point xl, namely Cjil , Pji(xl).
[S3] Send Cjil to neighbor node l of node i.
[S4] Each neighbor l of node i aggregates the shares it
received from all neighbors of node i and computes
the value Sli =
∑
j∈Ni
ajiCjil. (Note that the re-
sult of this computation is equal to the value of a
polynomial of degree di−1, whose free coefficient
is equal to the weighted sum of all messages sent
to node i by its neighbors.)
[S5] Each neighbor l sends the sum Sli to node i.
[S6] Node i treats the value received from node l as a
value of a polynomial of degree di − 1 evaluated
at the point xi. Node i interpolates Pi(x) for ex-
tracting the free coefficient, which in this case is
the weighted sum of all messages
∑
j∈Ni
ajimji.
Note that the message mji sent by node j remains
hidden if less than di neighbors of i collude to learn it
(this is ensured since these neighbors learn strictly less
than di values of a polynomial of degree di − 1). The
protocol requires each node j to send messages to all
other neighbors of each of its neighbors. We discuss
the applicability of this requirement in Section 9.
4.4 Extending the method to support multiplication
Assume that node i needs to compute the multiplica-
tion of the values of two messages that it receives from
nodes j and j′. The Shamir secret sharing scheme
can be extended to support multiplication using the
construction of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson,
whose details appear in [9]. This requires two changes
to the basic protocol. First, the degree of the polynomi-
als must be strictly less than |Ni|/2, where |Ni| is the
number of neighbors of the node receiving the mes-
sages. (This means, in particular, that security is now
only guaranteed as long as less than half of the neigh-
bors collude.) In addition, the neighboring nodes must
exchange a single round of messages after receiving
the messages from nodes j and j′. We have not imple-
mented this variant of the protocol.
4.5 Working in different fields
The operations that can be applied to secrets in the
Shamir secret sharing scheme, or to encrypted values
Fig. 1 Schematic message flow in the proposed methods. The
task of node i is to compute the sum of all messages: mki +
mji + mli (a) describes a message sent from j to i using ran-
dom perturbation. (b) describes steps [S3] in our SSS scheme,
where the same message mji is split into shares sent to all of
i neighbors. (c) describes steps [S4] in our SSS scheme, where
shares destined to i are aggregated by its neighbors. (d) shows
steps [H6] in our SSS scheme, which is equivalent (in term of
message flow) to step [H2] in our homomorphic scheme.
in a homomorphic encryption scheme, are defined in
a finite field or ring over which the schemes are de-
fined (for example, in the secret sharing case, over a
field Zp where p is a prime number). The operations
that we want to compute, however, might be defined
over the Real numbers. Working in a field is sufficient
for computing additions or multiplications of integers,
if we know that the size of the field is larger than the
maximum result of the operation. If the basic elements
we work with are Real numbers, we can round them
first to the next integer, or, alternatively, first multiply
them by some constant c (say, c = 106) and then round
the result to the closest integer. (This essentially means
that we work with accuracy of 1/c if the computation
involves only additions, or an accuracy of 1/cd if the
computation involves summands composed of up to d
multiplications.)
4.6 Discussion
Handling division operations. Handling division is much
harder, since we are essentially limited to working with
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integer numbers. One possible workaround is possible
if we know in advance that a number x might have to
be divided by a different number from a set D (say,
the numbers in the range [1, 100]). In that case we first
multiply x by the least common multiple (lcm) of the
numbers in D. This initial step ensures that dividing
the result by a number from D results in an integer
number.
An optimization. It is possible to optimize the SSS con-
struction in the case that the degree of the polynomial
used in the vicinity of node i equals the number of
node i’s neighbors (di − 1 = |Ni|). In this case it is
possible to avoid the polynomial evaluation and inter-
polation. This is done by replacing steps [S1, S2] with
the following operations: when a node j would like to
send a scalar message mji to node i, it will select di
numbers at random, such that their sum in an appropri-
ate finite field is mji. Steps [S3−S5] remain the same.
In step [S6] instead of node i performing a polyno-
mial interpolation the values it received, it simply ag-
gregates them using summation to obtain the weighted
sum
∑
j∈Ni
ajimji. The drawback of this method is
that there is no redundancy in the received parts, and
as a result even a single neighbor that does not sent its
share to node i can prevent node i from completing its
computation.
Optimization of Lagrange interpolation. Each node must
compute, in every step of the protocol, a Lagrange in-
terpolation of the shares it receives. Namely, node i
which receives shares from nodesu1, . . . , udi must com-
pute the free coefficient of the corresponding polyno-
mial. This is done by computing the Lagrange inter-
polation formula
∑di
j=1 λjP (uj), where P (uj) is the
share received from node uj , and λj is the correspond-
ing Lagrange coefficient which is defined as
λj =
Π1≤k≤di; k 6=j k
Π1≤k≤di; k 6=j (k − j)
.
Note that the computation of λj involves many mul-
tiplications, but it only depends the identities of i’s
neighbors, rather than on the values of their shares.
Therefore, node i can precompute the Lagrange coeffi-
cients, and later use them to compute the linear combi-
nation
∑
λjP (uj), of the shares it receives. This step
considerably reduces the online overhead of i’s opera-
tion.
Using a single polynomial for implementing broad-
cast. Assume a setting in which node j needs to broad-
cast the same value mj to all its neighbors. (This as-
sumption does not hold in general, however there are
special cases where it does hold, for example the Ja-
cobi algorithm described in Section 7.1.)
In the SSS method described above, node j needs
to construct a different polynomial Pi for each neigh-
bor i, encode mj as the free coefficient of Pi, and send
shares of Pi to the neighbors of node i. For implement-
ing broadcast, node j can generate a single polynomial
whose free coefficient is mj , and send values of this
polynomial to the neighbors of each of its neighbors.
This is possible if there is an upper bound of d(j) − 1
on the number of colluders among the second degree
neighbors of j (i.e., among neighbors of j’s neigh-
bors), and it also holds that no neighbor of j has less
than d(j) neighbors. In that case node j sets the de-
gree of the polynomial to d(j) − 1, and sends a share
of this polynomial to each neighbor of its neighbor.
(Setting the degree to this value enables each neighbor
to interpolate the messages sent to it, yet prevents the
colluders from learning illegitimate information.)
An obvious advantage of this approach is that j
needs to send a single share to each neighbor u of its
neighbors, even if u happens to be a neighbor of two
or more of j’s neighbors. In the previous SSS based
method, node j needed to send to u a different share
for every node i which is a joint neighbor of j and u.
Consider now the aggregation operation that is per-
formed by u, in which u computes a linear combina-
tion of all shares which are destined to i. These shares
are values of different polynomials (generated by dif-
ferent neighbors of i), but the requirement above en-
sures that each of these polynomials, say polynomial
Pj′ generated by node j′, is of degree that is at most
d(j
′) − 1. This value is smaller than di, the number
of neighbors of i. Therefore the linear combination
of these polynomials is a polynomial whose degree is
smaller than di. Node i receives di shares of this poly-
nomial and can therefore interpolate it.
Collusion of distant nodes in the graph. The privacy
of the data that node j sends to node i, encoded based
on Shamir’s secret sharing using a polynomial of de-
gree d − 1, is preserved as long as an adversary does
not get hold of d shares. Therefore, if j uses a different
polynomial for encoding the messages sent to each of
its neighbors (i.e., it does not use the method discussed
in the previous paragraph), then it only needs to care
about collusions between members of the set of neigh-
bors of each of its neighbors separately. (E.g., if j has
8 neighbors, and it is known that for each neighbor i it
holds that no more than 3 of i’s neighbors collude, then
j can encode its messages using a different polynomial
of degree 3 for each of its neighbors. This encoding is
secure even if j sends the same message mj to all its
neighbors, and even if the total number of colluders is
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much larger than 3, since each choice of the free coeffi-
cients of the polynomials is plausible given the values
known to the colluders.)
If j uses a single polynomial to encode the mes-
sages it sends to all its neighbors, as is detailed in the
previous paragraph, then it must make sure that the de-
gree of the polynomial is at least as large as the poten-
tial number of colluders between all neighbors of its
neighbors. It does not have to care about the integrity
of other members of the network.
5 Cryptographic background for the malicious
adversary model
In this section, we describe two cryptographic prim-
itives that are used in our construction for the mali-
cious adversary model. In this section we give a brief
review of those primitives, while in Section 6 we ex-
plain how those primitives are used in the context of
secure multi-party computation.
5.1 Pedersen VSS
Pedersen [29] presents a non-interactive verifiable se-
cret sharing scheme (VSS). In this scheme, each party
can verify that he received a correct share, without
communicating with any other party.
Pedersen VSS is based on the usage of a commit-
ment scheme which was also designed by Pedersen.
(A commitment scheme enables a committer to com-
mit to a value without revealing it. Later the committer
can reveal that value. Other parties are assured that the
committer was not able to change the committed value
after the commitment was generated.) The commit-
ment scheme is based on the assumption that the dis-
crete logarithm problem is hard in a certain group. The
commitment scheme operates in the following way:
Two generators g and h of the group are chosen at ran-
dom. (The discrete logarithm assumption therefore im-
plies that computing logg(h) is infeasible.) In order to
commit to a value s , the committer randomly chooses
a value t and computes the commitment E(s, t) ,
gsht. Then, in order to open the commitment, the com-
mitter reveals s and t.
It was proven that the committer cannot change
her mind after generating the commitment. This was
proved by showing that a committer that can change
the committed value from s to a different value s′ can
compute logg(h). Pedersen then showed how to use
this primitive to share a secret s between n parties in
a way that enables them to verify that their shares are
consistent. We describe this protocol below, where the
dealer D plays the role of the committer of the basic
commitment scheme.
[VS1] D performs the basic commitment scheme and com-
putes a commitment of the secret s: E0 , E(s, t) .
[VS2] D performs the first step of Shamir secret sharing
scheme: D randomly chooses a polynomial P (x)
of degree at most d − 1 subject to the constraint
P (0) = s and computes P (i) for i = 1, ..., n (we
denote P (x) =
∑d−1
k=0 pkx
k; therefore p0 = s).
[VS3] D randomly chooses a polynomial R(x) of degree
at most d−1 subject to the constraintR(0) = t and
computes R(i) for i = 1, ..., n (we denote R(x) =∑d−1
k=0 rkx
k; therefore r0 = t .)
[VS4] D performs the second step of Shamir secret shar-
ing scheme: D secretly sends (P (i), R(i)), the i’th
share, to party i, for i = 1, ..., n.
[VS5] D computes and broadcasts a commitment toP (x)’s
coefficients p0, ..., pd−1 using R(x)’s coefficients
r0, ..., rd−1. I.e., D broadcasts Ej , E(pj , rj) for
j = 0, ...d − 1. Denote E = (E0, E2, · · · , Ed−1)
the set of all commitments.
[VS6] Party i can now verify that the share (P (i), R(i))
that it received is correct. This is done by verifying
the equation E(P (i), R(i)) =
∏d−1
j=0 (Ej)
ij
.
Note that when the parties send their shares to the party
who is supposed to combine them in order to compute
the secret, the verification data E0, . . . , Ed−1 can be
used to verify the correctness of the received shares.
5.2 Byzantine agreement
The Byzantine agreement (Byzantine Generals) prob-
lem was first introduced by Pease, Shostak and Lam-
port [23]. It is now considered as a fundamental prob-
lem in fault-tolerant distributed computing. The task is
to reach agreement in a set of n nodes in which up-
to f nodes may be faulty. A distinguished node (the
General or the initiator) broadcasts a value m, follow-
ing which all nodes exchange messages until the non-
faulty nodes agree upon the same value. If the initiator
is non-faulty then all non-faulty nodes are required to
agree on the same value that the initiator sent.
On-going faults whose nature is not predictable or
that express complex behavior are most suitably ad-
dressed in the Byzantine fault model. It is the preferred
fault model in order to seal off unexpected behavior
within limitations on the number of concurrent faults.
With respect to the bounds on redundancy, the Byzan-
tine agreement problem has been shown to have no de-
terministic solution if more than n/3 of the nodes are
concurrently faulty [24].
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A Byzantine Agreement protocol satisfies the fol-
lowing typical properties:
Agreement: The protocol returns the same value at all
correct nodes;
Validity: If the General is correct, then all the correct
nodes return the value sent by the General;
Termination: The protocol terminates in a finite time.
Standard deterministic Byzantine agreement algo-
rithms operate in the synchronous network model in
which it is assumed that all correct nodes initialize
the agreement procedure and can exchange messages
within a round. In the context of our paper one can use
the modular solution appearing in [32]. That protocol
requires 2f +1 rounds of communication and O(nf2)
messages, where f is the bound on the number of ma-
licious nodes. The protocol can be invoked by each
node that wants to broadcast a message. The set of par-
ticipating nodes are the General’s direct neighbors. In
some cases we may define a larger set, a set that con-
tains some neighbors of neighbors. It is assumed that
every pair of nodes in the set can exchange messages.
For that to hold we assume that the network connectiv-
ity among the members of the set will be at least 2f+1
(see [16]).
Byzantine agreements are guaranteed to provide
the same value at all participating non-faulty nodes.
If the general is faulty that value may turn out to be
some default value. In the context of our paper, since
we carry out computations based of the values sent by
all the neighbors of a node we assume that the default
value is a zero. In the context of the current paper we
also assume that for each node i, di > f.
6 Extending the construction to support malicious
adversaries
In this section we extend the SSS protocol of Sec-
tion 4.3, to defend against malicious peers. The new
protocol utilizes the mechanisms described in the pre-
vious section. Before presenting the full protocol, we
devise a modified VSS scheme. This scheme is needed,
since the original VSS relies on a broadcast primitive,
which does not exist in a Peer-to-Peer network. The
modified protocol is following Pedersen’s VSS scheme,
except of step [VS5] which is replaced by a Byzantine
agreement. (Byzantine agreement is used in order to
ensure that all relevant nodes receive the same veri-
fication information, i.e. exponents of coefficients, of
Pedersen’s protocol.)
6.1 Modified VSS
In each round of the algorithm, when a node j would
like to send a scalar value mji to node i it does the
following operations:
[MV1] Node j perform steps [VS1-VS4] in Pedersen’s scheme
for creating verifiable shares of the message mji
and sends the shares to node i’s neighbors.
[MV2] Node j runs a Byzantine agreement protocol be-
tween j and all of node i’s neighbors (including
i itself), in which node j broadcasts the set E of
commitments to the coefficients of the polynomi-
als. (We denote this set as E(ji) later in the proto-
col.) This step replaces the broadcast primitive in
[VS5] that does not exist in a Peer-to-Peer network.
[MV3] Node i’s neighbors verify the validity of the shares
using [VS6]. In case the share received by neighbor
l is not valid, this neighbor informs node i about
that and does not send it the required linear combi-
nation of shares.
6.2 The full protocol
Initialization:
[BS0] We assume that the coefficients aji are known in
advance to all neighbors of i. (If that is not the case,
then these coefficients are decided by either node i
or j. That node must perform with node i’s neigh-
bors a Byzantine agreement for the value aji.)
This step is needed because node i’s neighbors will
verify the weighted sum computation it will carry out
later.
In each round of the algorithm, when a node j would
like to send a scalar value mji to node i it does the
following operations:
[BS1] Protocol [MV1-3] is executed for sending and ver-
ifying the shares of the message mji. (This step
is only executed in the first round of the proto-
col. In later rounds it is replaced by Step [BS6] in
which the neighbors also verify that mji is indeed
the message that j was supposed to send according
to the protocol.)
[BS2] Each neighbor l of node i that validated all the
shares of all the neighbors of node i aggregates
the shares it received from all these neighbors us-
ing linear coefficients {aji | j ∈ Ni}, and com-
putes the value Sli =
∑
j∈Ni
ajiPji(l), and the
value Tli =
∑
j∈Ni
ajiRji(l). (This computation
computes the values of two polynomials of degree
di − 1, whose free coefficients are equal to the
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weighted sum of all messages mji sent to node i
by its neighbors, and of all values tji that are used
for computing the corresponding commitments.)
[BS3] Each neighbor l sends the sums Sli, Tli to node i.
[BS4] Node i first verifies the values it received from its
neighbors: Each neighbor must essentially send val-
ues of polynomials generated as linear combina-
tions of the polynomialsPji, Rji of all neighbors j
of i, for which commitments has been sent. There-
fore a linear combination of the commitments can
be used to verify the values received from the neigh-
bors. In more detail, let E(ji) = (E(ji)0 , . . . , E
(ji)
d−1)
be the commitments sent by node j with respect
to the message mji. For every neighbor l which
sent to i the values Sli, Tli, node i verifies that
E(Sli, Tli) = Π
d−1
k=0 (E
(i)
k )
lk
, where E(i)k is equal
to Πj∈Ni(E
(ji)
k )
aji
.
[BS5] If di or more messages sent from neighbors were
verified correctly, node i considers these Sli values
as values of a polynomial Pi of degree di − 1. It
interpolates Pi(x) in order to extract the free coef-
ficient, which in this case is the weighted sum of
messages sent to it,
∑
j∈Ni
ajimji.
[BS6] Note that the weighted sum m′ = ∑j∈Ni ajimji
which was calculated by i is included in the mes-
sage that i must send to its neighbors in the next
round of the protocol. (Namely, i must send to ev-
ery neighbor i′ of his the message mii′ = aii′m′.)
In addition, we will require that the t′ value that i
uses in a VSS for computing E′0 = gm
′
ht
′
will be∑
j∈Ni
ajitji, namely be equal to the linear com-
bination of the t values in the messages sent to i.
The neighbors of i must therefore verify that they
receive shares of m′. This is done in the follow-
ing way: Each neighbor i′ first computes a linear
combination of the free coefficient of the Pedersen
commitments (of messages destined to i) that it re-
ceived in the last step: E(i)0 = Πj∈Ni(E
(ji)
0 )
aji
.
Node i runs a modified VSS protocol where it com-
mits to m′ using the value t′ and polynomials P ′()
and R′() of the required degrees. The result is a
vectorE′ whose first entry isE(i)0 as defined above.
Node i runs steps [MV1-MV3] with these values,
sending them to all its neighbors. Each of the neigh-
bors verifies that the first entry of E′ is indeedE(i)0 .
Later in the execution of this step, each node i′
verifies the linear combination it receives from its
neighbors using the values {E(i)0 | i ∈ Ni′}. If a
verification by a node fails, it aborts the protocol
and notifies its neighbors.
6.3 Protocol analysis
The extended protocol complexity is higher than the
SSS protocol for the semi-honest model. Below we
present an analysis of the efficiency of the extended
protocol in terms of computational and message over-
head.
First we list the computational and message over-
head of the building blocks of the protocol, and then
we sum them.
– Byzantine Agreement: A Byzantine agreement of
|Ni| nodes of which at most d nodes are malicious
consists of |Ni|d2 messages in 2d+3 communica-
tion rounds.
– Polynomial Creation: Creating a random polyno-
mial of degree d − 1 costs O(d) random number
generation operations; this computational overhead
is negligible in the overall computational overhead.
– Polynomial Evaluation: Evaluating of a polyno-
mial of degree d − 1 costs O(d2) multiplication
operations.
– Values Verification: Verifying of a value (a share
or a weighted sum) costs O(d) exponentiation op-
erations.
– Polynomial Interpolation: Interpolating a poly-
nomial of degree d− 1 costs O(d2) multiplication
operations.
Message overhead: The dominant element regarding
message overhead is the Byzantine agreement protocol
(Steps [BS0], [BS1], [BS6]) that requires |Ni|d2 mes-
sages in 2d+ 3 communication rounds.
Computational overhead The dominant element re-
garding computational overhead is the values verifica-
tions (Steps [BS1], [BS4], [BS6]) that all together cost
O(|Ni|d) exponentiation operations.
There are some means to minimize the number of
computing operations:
– Polynomial evaluation optimization. Polynomial
evaluation, that normally takes (d−1)d2 multiplica-
tions, can be optimize to take d multiplications, if
the value of the input parameter is bounded in a
known range and all of d exponentiations of all
the possible values are prepared ahead, e.g., in the
initialization step (this implicitly requires knowing
d ahead). This decreases the number of comput-
ing operations in Steps [BS1] and [BS2]. A simi-
lar idea can be implemented in the verification in
Steps [BS1], [BS4], and [BS6].
– Commitments calculations optimization. The com-
mitments that are agreed on Step [MV2] E(ji) =
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(E
(ji)
0 , . . . , E
(ji)
d−1) can be computed ahead if the
polynomials coefficients are bounded in a known
range. This can be done by preparing ahead com-
mitments Ex,y = E(x, y) = gxhy for each x, y
that are in the bounded range. This decreases the
number of computing operations in Step [MV2].
Security. We argue here that either every party fol-
lows the protocol, or the protocol aborts. Every modi-
fied VSS protocol uses Byzantine agreement to broad-
cast the verification data E. Therefore either all honest
nodes receive shares corresponding to the same poly-
nomial, or the protocol aborts. Furthermore, the linear
combinations of these shares that are sent to node i can
be verified by the same data, and therefore no neighbor
of i can send a corrupt linear combination. Finally, in
the next step of the protocol node i must send a linear
combination of the messages it received. This is ver-
ified by its neighbors, by using the same verification
data, as is detailed in Step [BS6] of the protocol.
For using the Byzantine agreement protocol, we
demand that f , the number of malicious peer in each
vicinity is less than 1/3 of the peers in that vicinity. Al-
ternatively, a Byzantine agreement with signatures can
be used, tolerating any number of malicious nodes.
6.4 Discussion
A more realistic model. The Shamir Secret Sharing
protocol makes sure that one party’s share is not re-
vealed by other parties, unless at least t parties coop-
erate (t− 1 is the degree of the polynomial). However,
a model on which most of the parties are insensitive to
their privacy is realistic. In such a model, there is no
reason to make an effort in order to prevent revealing
shares of these insensitive nodes. This observation can
be refined by setting a “paranoic coefficient” for each
node that describes the extent of privacy-sensitivity of
this node. As the “paranoic coefficient” decreases, so
does the degree of the polynomial. In particular, insen-
sitive nodes can use a polynomial of degree 0.
Synchronous vs. Asynchronous execution. In this pa-
per, we have presented the iterative algorithm that com-
putes weighted sums as a synchronous algorithm which
operates in rounds. This was mainly done for simplify-
ing our exposition. However, in practice it is not valid
to assume that the clocks and message delays are syn-
chronized in a large Peer-to-Peer network. Luckily, it
is known that linear iterative algorithms such as the
Jacobi algorithm converge in asynchronous settings as
well. Specifically, the Gauss Seidel algorithm is an asyn-
chronous version of the Jacobi algorithm which typi-
cally converges faster [10].
An optimization to the Byzantine agreement protocol.
It is possible to optimize the Byzantine agreement by
using a Public Key infrastructure that enables signa-
tures. The existence of the Public Key infrastructure
limits the ability of the malicious nodes to introduce
undetected superfluous messages. Algorithms that reach
Byzantine agreement under such assumptions require
sending only a constant number of messages of each
node to all participating nodes [17]. Moreover, such
protocols can overcome any ratio of faulty to correct
nodes.
Another optimization is to replace the determinis-
tic protocol with a probabilistic one (cf. [8,19,13]). A
typical probabilistic protocol terminates in an expected
constant number of rounds. The drawback is that such
protocols do not guarantee that all non-faulty nodes
complete the protocol at the same time. In our context
this implies that a node waits a round before sending
messages based on the agreement, to ensure that oth-
ers also completed the protocol. Our protocol requires
running several agreements in concurrently. The asyn-
chronous nature of the execution allow nodes to use
each value once the agreement about it is completed.
7 Case Study: neighborhood based collaborative
filtering
To demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, we give
a specific instance of a problem our framework can
solve, preserving users’ privacy. Our chosen example
is in the field of collaborative filtering. We have chosen
to implement the neighborhood based collaborative fil-
tering algorithm, a state-of-the-art algorithm, winner
of the Netflix progress prize of 2007. When adapt-
ing this algorithm to a Peer-to-Peer network, there are
two main challenges: first, the algorithm is centralized,
while we would like to distribute it, without losing ac-
curacy of the computed result. Second, we would like
to add a privacy preserving layer, which prevents the
computing nodes from learning any information about
neighboring nodes or other nodes rating, except of the
computed solution.
We first describe the centralized version, and later
we extend it to be computed in a Peer-to-Peer network.
Given a possibly sparse user ratings matrix Rm×n,
where m is the number of users and n is the number of
items, each user likes to compute an output ratings for
all the items.
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In the neighborhood based approach [6], the out-
put rating is computed using a weighted average of the
neighboring peers:
rui =
∑
j∈Ni
rujwij .
Our goal is to find the weights matrix W where wij
signifies the weight node i assigns node j.
We define the following least square minimization
problem for user i :
min
w
∑
v 6=i
(rvi −
∑
j∈Ni
rvjwij)
2 .
The optimal solution is formed by differentiation
and solution of a linear systems of equations Rw = b.
The optimal weights (for each user) are given by:
w = (RTR)−1RTb . (2)
We would like to distribute the neighborhood based
collaborative filtering problem to be computed in a Peer-
to-Peer network. Each peer has its own rating as input
(the matching row of the matrix R) and the goal is
to compute locally, using interaction with neighboring
nodes, the weight matrix W, where each node has the
matching row in this matrix. Furthermore, the peers
would like to keep their input rating private, where no
information is leaked during the computation to neigh-
boring or other nodes. The peers will obtain only their
matching output rating as a result of this computation.
We propose a secure multi-party computation frame-
work, to solve the collaborative filtering problem ef-
ficiently and distributively, preserving users’ privacy.
The computation does not reveal any information about
users’ prior ratings, nor on the computed results.
7.1 The Jacobi algorithm for solving systems of linear
equations
In this section we give an example of one of the sim-
plest iterative algorithms for solving systems of lin-
ear equations, the Jacobi algorithm. This will serve as
an example for an algorithm our framework is able to
compute, for solving the neighborhood based collab-
orative filtering problem. Note that there are numer-
ous numerical methods we can compute securely using
our framework, among them Gauss Seidel, EM (ex-
pectation minimization), Conjugate gradient, gradient
descent, Belief Propagation, Cholskey decomposition,
principal component analysis, SVD etc.
Given a system of linear equations Ax = b, where
A is a matrix of size n×n, ∀iaii 6= 0 and b ∈ Rn, the
Jacobi algorithm [10] starts from an initial guess x0,
and iterates:
xri =
bi −
∑
j∈Ni
aijx
r−1
j
aii
. (3)
The Jacobi algorithm is easily distributed since ini-
tially each node selects an initial guess x0i , and the
values xrj are sent among neighbors. A sufficient con-
dition for the algorithm convergence is when the spec-
tral radius ρ(I −D−1A) < 1, where I is the identity
matrix and D = diag(A). This algorithm is known
to work in asynchronous settings as well. In practice,
when converging, the Jacobi algorithm convergence speed
is logarithmic3 in n.
Our goal is to compute a privacy-preserving ver-
sion of the Jacobi algorithm, where the inputs of the
nodes are private, and no information is leaked during
the rounds of the computation.
Note, that the Jacobi algorithm serves as an excel-
lent example since its simple update rule contains all
the basic operation we would like to support: addition,
multiplication and substraction. Our framework sup-
ports all of those numerical operations, thus capturing
numerous numerical algorithms.
7.2 Using the Jacobi algorithm for solving the
neighborhood based collaborative filtering problem
First, we perform a distributed preconditioning of the
matrix R. Each node i divides its input row of the ma-
trix R by Rii. This simple operation is done to avoid
the division in Eq. (3), while not affecting the solution
vector w.
Second, since Jacobi algorithm’s input is a square
n × n matrix, and our rating matrix R is of size m ×
n, we use the following “trick”: We construct a new
symmetric data matrix R˜ based on the non-rectangular
rating matrix R ∈ Rm×n
R˜ ,
(
Im R
T
R 0
)
∈ R(m+n)×(m+n) . (4)
Additionally, we define a new vector of variables w˜ ,
{wˆT , zT }T ∈ R(m+n)×1, where xˆ ∈ Rm×1 is the
(to be shown) solution vector and z ∈ Rn×1 is an
auxiliary hidden vector, and a new observation vector
b˜ , {0T ,bT }T ∈ R(m+n)×1.
Now, we would like to show that solving the sym-
metric linear system R˜w˜ = b˜, taking the first m en-
tries of the corresponding solution vector w˜ is equiva-
lent to solving the original system Rw = b. Note that
3 Computing the pseudo inverse solution (equation 2) itera-
tively can be done more efficiently using newer algorithms, for
example [11]. For the purpose of the clarify of explanation, we
use the Jacobi algorithm.
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in the new construction the matrix R˜ is still sparse,
and has at most 2mn off-diagonal nonzero elements.
Thus, when running the Jacobi algorithm we have at
most 2mn messages per round.
Writing explicitly the symmetric linear system’s
equations, we get
wˆ+RTz = 0, Rwˆ = b.
By extracting wˆ we obtain
wˆ = (RTR)−1RTb,
the desired solution of Eq. (2).
8 Experimental Results
We have implemented our proposed constructions for
the semi-honest model using a large scale simulation.
Our simulation is written in C, consists of about 1500
lines of code, and uses MPI, for running the simula-
tion in parallel. We run the simulation on a cluster of
Linux Pentium IV computers, 2.4Ghz, with 4GB RAM
memory. We use the open source Paillier implementa-
tion of [3]. Currently, we have implemented fully the
semi-honest protocols. An area of future work is to im-
plement the full protocol against the malicious partici-
pants as well.
We use several large topologies for demonstrating
the applicability of our approach. The different topolo-
gies are listed in Table 8. The DIMES dataset [31] is
an Internet router topology of around 300,000 routers
and 2.2 million communication links connecting them,
captured in January 2007. A subgraph of the DIMES
dataset is shown in Figure 2. The Blog network, is a
social network, web crawl of Internet blogs of half a
million blog sites and eleven million links connecting
them. Finally, the Netflix [2] movie ratings data, con-
sists of around 500,000 users and 100,000,000 movie
ratings. This last topology is a bipartite graph with
users at one side, and movies at the other. This topol-
ogy is not a Peer-to-Peer network, but relevant for the
collaborative filtering problem. We have artificially cre-
ated a Peer-to-Peer network, where each user is a node,
the movies are nodes as well, and edges are the ratings
assigned to the movies.
Topology Nodes Edges Data Source
Blogs Web Crawl 1.5M 8M IBM
DIMES 337,326 2,249,832 DIMES
Netflix 497,759 100M Netflix
Table 1 Topologies used for experimentation
We ignore algorithm accuracy since this problem
was addressed in detail in [6]. We are mainly con-
cerned with the overheads of the privacy preserving
mechanisms. Based on the experimental results shown
below, we conclude that the main overhead in imple-
menting our proposed mechanisms is the computational
overhead, since the communication latency exists any-
way in the underlying topology, and we compare the
run of algorithms with and without the added privacy
mechanisms overhead. For that purpose, we ignore the
communication latency in our simulations. This can
be justified, because in the random perturbations and
homomorphic encryption schemes, we do not change
the number of communication rounds, so the commu-
nication latency remains the same with or without the
added privacy preserving mechanisms. In the SSS scheme,
we double the number of communication rounds, so
the incurred latency is doubled as well.
Table 2 compares the running times of the basic
operations in the three schemes. Each operation was
repeated 100,000 times and an average is given. As
expected the heaviest computation is the Paillier asym-
metric encryption, with a security parameter of 2,048
bits. It can be easily verified, that while the SSS basic
operation takes around tens of microseconds, the Pail-
lier basic operations takes fractions of seconds (except
of the homomorphic multiplication which is quite ef-
ficient since it does not involve exponentiation). In a
Peer-to-Peer network, when a peer has likely tens of
connections, sending encrypted message to all of them
will take several seconds. Furthermore, this time esti-
mation assumes that the values sent by the function are
scalars. In the vector case, the operation will be much
slower.
Table 3 outlines the running time needed to run
8 iterations of the Jacobi algorithm, on the different
topologies. Four modes of operations are listed: no pri-
vacy preserving means we run the algorithm without
adding any privacy layer for baseline timing compari-
son. Next, our three proposed schemes are shown.
In the Netflix dataset, we had to use eight comput-
ing nodes in parallel, because our simulation memory
requirement could not fit into one processor.
As clearly shown in Table 3, our SSS scheme has
significantly reduced computation overhead relative to
the homomorphic encryption scheme, while having an
equivalent level of security (assuming that the Paillier
encryption is semantically secure). In a Peer-to-Peer
network, with tens of neighbors, the homomorphic en-
cryption scheme incurs a high overhead on the com-
puting nodes.
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Scheme Operation Time (micro second) Msg size (bytes)
Random perturbation Adding noise 0.0783745 8
Receiver operation −
SSS Polynomial generation and evaluation 11.18382125 8
Polynomial extrapolation 6.13709025
Paillier Key generation 5016199.4 2048
Encryption 203478.62
Decryption 193537.97
Multiplication 99.063958
Table 2 Running time of local operations. As expected, the Paillier cryptosystem basic operations are time consuming relative to the
SSS scheme.
Topology Scheme Time (HH:MM:SS) computing nodes
DIMES None 0:33.36 1
Random Perturbations 0:35.27 1
SSS 10:53.44 1
Paillier 28:44:24.00 1
Blogs None 1:28.16 1
Random Perturbations 1:34.85 1
SSS 38:00.24 1
Paillier 101:52:00.00 1
Netflix None 5:31.14 8
Random Perturbations 5:54.69 8
SSS 21:40.00 8
Paillier - -
Table 3 Running time of eight iterations of the Jacobi algorithm. The baseline timing is compared to running without any privacy
preserving mechanisms added. Empirical results show that computation time of the homomorphic scheme is a factor of about 1,350
times slower then the SSS scheme.
Fig. 2 DIMES Internet router topology consisting around 300K
routers and 2.2M communication links. A subgraph containing
500 nodes is shown.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
As demonstrated by the experimental results section,
we have shown that the secret sharing scheme in the
semi-honest model has the lowest computation over-
head relative to the other schemes. Furthermore, this
scheme does not involve a trusted third party, as needed
by the homomorphic encryption scheme for the thresh-
old key generation phase. The size of the messages
sent using this method is about the same as in the origi-
nal method, unlike the homomorphic encryption which
significantly increases message sizes. However, the draw-
back of this scheme is that neighboring nodes to node
i need to communicate directly between themselves
(and each message sent to node i needs to be converted
to messages sent to all its neighbors). In Peer-to-Peer
systems with locality property it might be reasonable
to assume that communication between the neighbors
of node i is possible. (There is a way to circumvent this
requirement, by adding asymmetric encryption. Each
node will have a public key, where message destined
to this node are encrypted using its public key. That
way if node j needs to send a message to node l, it can
ask node i do deliver it, while ensuring that node i does
not learn the content of the message. We identify this
extension to our scheme as an area for future work.)
In the current work, we have extended the SSS
protocol to defend against malicious participants. We
have shown that the extension provides a completely
secure solution. However, the main drawback is the
high protocol overhead, since we need to perform mul-
tiple Byzantine agreement protocols and commitments,
for verifying every single computation done in the net-
work. An area of future work is to bridge between our
theoretical work for the malicious case to a practical
deployment in a Peer-to-Peer network.
Another area of future work is the extension of the
homomorphic protocol to support malicious partici-
pants. One possible approach is to utilize the threshold
Paillier cryptosystem supports verification keys [20],
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that enables participants to verify validity of encrypted
messages.
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